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should be a matter of private right in the widow. Determination of whether A or B
is the widow of X is a judicial rather than an administrative function, and in conse-
quence mandamus should lie under the ministerial act doctrine of Kendall v. United
States 8 to compel payment of a granted pension to the proper person. This would not
subject the United States to a money judgment since the pension has already been
granted. By the same reasoning, the argument frequently employed, namely, that a
pension is a gratuity, fails. During the continuance of the pension judicial relief cer-
tainly should be allowed to the person who satisfies the statutory requirementsx9 but
who is not receiving the payments.
If it be argued that Congress intended the findings of the Veterans' Administration
to be conclusive even as to the person entitled to a pension, once the pension has been
granted, it may be questioned whether the judiciary may constitutionally be excluded
from this function.20
Labor Law-Sherman Anti-Trust Act-Legality of Labor-Employer Conspiracy
in Restraint of Trade--[Federal].-A criminal indictment under the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act was brought in a federal district court against the defendants for engaging
in a conspiracy to keep out of the East St. Louis market products made by manufac-
turers in states other than Illinois and to maintain artificially high prices in the local
area. The indictment alleged that the defendants (millwork, kitchen cabinet, and pre-
fabricated house manufacturers doing business in East St. Louis, Illinois, and sur-
rounding territory and the local carpenters' union) entered into an agreement whereby
the manufacturers agreed to employ only members of the labor union and the union
agreed to permit the manufacturers to use the AFL union label on their products and
to work only on materials bearing the label. Prospective purchasers and contractors
engaged in construction work in the East St. Louis area were allegedly warned by the
union that, if materials which did not bear the label were used, all members of the union
pricious. In Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443 (i934), the Court assumed jurisdiction to
review a determination of the Director of the Veterans' Bureau, citing as authority the Silber-
schein and Williams cases. Yet one week after the Reynolds case was decided, the Court indi-
cated in Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 587 (1934), that § 5 of the Economy Act, note 16
supra, removed the qualifications to administrative finality in pension awards or claims that
were expressed in the Silberschein and Williams cases. The Economy Act, however, was in
effect at the time the Reynolds case was-decided. Thus two inconsistent doctrines of the
Supreme Court appear to be available as authority. See United States v. Brownley, 34 F.
Supp. 923, 924 (Md. 194o), where the court which decided the instant case cited the Williams
case as good authority; see also Van Home v. Hines, 122 F. (2d) 207 (App. D.C. 1941), for a
refusal to exercise jurisdiction on the authority of the Lynch case.
is 12 Pet. (U.S.) 524 (1838).
X" It might also be suggested that the Director of the Veterans' Bureau is authorized to act
only with respect to the person determined by the court to be the widow. Widowhood would
thus be a jurisdictional fact, determination of which must be left to the court. Cf. Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
go See Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 917-i9 (1930), for a dis-
cussion of the significance of Article 3 of the Constitution in relation to the problems of legis-
lative limitation of the court's jurisdiction.
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and of other affiliated unions employed on the job would not be permitted to work. The
indictment further alleged acts of violence by the union against laborers not affiliated
with the union. The defendants moved to quash the indictment on the ground that it
contained prejudicial surplusage and also entered a plea in abatement which ques-
tioned the sufficiency of the indictment in view of United States v. Hutcheson., The
court granted the motion but sustained the government's demurrer to the plea. Held,
that under the Hutcheson case, activities resulting from an agreement of a labor union
with a party not in interest are indictable if the activities indulged in are not exempted
under the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Among many activities al-
leged in the indictment the court specifically held three not exempted and hence indict-
able under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act: r) a refusal by the union to install materials
manufactured outside the state of Illinois, 2) a refusal to erect prefabricated houses
made outside the state of Illinois, and 3) violence. United States v. Goedde.3
The facts in the instant case appear to be on all fours with those of United States v.
Brims,4 a case in which the Supreme Court sustained an indictment under the Sherman
Act of an alliance between employers and a labor union to gain a mutual monopolistic
advantage. The question raised in the instant case is whether or not the Brims case
has been modified by the Hutcheson decision. In that decision Mr. Justice Frankfurter
held that an alleged violation of the Sherman Act must be considered in the light of the
Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.s Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act6
curtails the power of the federal courts to grant injunctions which would restrain cer-
tain listed activities that involve or grow out of a labor dispute as broadly defined in
Section 13.7 This definition of a labor dispute Mr. Justice Frankfurter infused into
Section 20 of the Clayton Act s with the result that if the acts complained of are non-
enjoinable under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, they must also be legal under Section 209
by virtue of the concluding clause of that section.Io
It might be argued that the indictment in the instant case reveals a labor dispute
between the local carpenters and the out-of-state manufacturers who employed cheap-
' 32 U.S. 219 (1941).
* Because of the unusual practice of the district court in passing upon the labor question
after quashing theindictment, the reviewing court can avoid discussing the labor issue by sus-
taining the district court's action in quashing the indictment on the ground of prejudicial
surplusage. The Law Review has been notified that the Government intends to file a petition
for rehearing in which the district court will be asked to delete from its opinion that portion
which deals with prejudicial surplusage.
340 F. Supp. 523 (Ill. 194); cf. United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 4o F. Supp. 964
(Ohio 1941).
4 272 U.S. 549 (1926).
s For a criticism of the Hutcheson case see Gregory, The New Sherman-Clayton-Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 5o3 (1941); Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint of
Trade in the Hutcheson Case, 36 Ill. L. Rev. i (i94I); 41 Col. L. Rev. 532, 534-35 n. i5 (1941).
647 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 104 (Supp. 1941).
747 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § II3(c) (Supp. 194).
8 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1927).
9 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235-36 (194I).
10cc .... nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be
violations of any law of the United States." 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1927).
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er,-non-union labor. In the absence of a labor-employer alliance, the effort of the local
carpenters' union to keep the cheaper out-of-state products from entering the local
area would then be non-indictable under the reasoning in the Hutcheson case. Since
the Sherman Act was not intended as a measure to regulate relations between employ-
ers and employees, the mere presence of the alliance should not taint the activities with
illegality. By such an argument the presence of a labor dispute would bring the labor-
employer alliance within the protection of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the conclud-
ing clause of Section 2o of the Clayton Act. The elimination of labor's liability under
the Sherman Act would thus become complete.
On the other hand, it may be argued that, although the result of the alliance was to
further the local union's interest with respect to the out-of-state manufacturers, the
primary purpose of the union was to gain a monopolistic advantage for both the local
carpenters and the' local manufacturers over out-of-state enterprises. Since it was the
policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Clayton Act to protect only those activ-
ities of a labor union which further its interests exclusively as against employers or
other labor groups, the alliance would be indictable, even in the presence of the labor
dispute between the local carpenters and out-of-state manufacturers. This argument is
supported by the dictum in the Hietcheson case that, when a union does not act in its
self-interest but combines with non-labor groups, the court may pass judgment on the
union's ends in order to determine what is lawful and unlawful under Section 2o of the
Clayton Act." ,
The present court's treatment of the effect of violence is questionable. When an in-
junction is sought under the Norris-LaGuardia Act to restrain activities involving vio-
lence, only the acts of violence are enjoined if these are separable from the peaceful ac-
tivities arising out of a labor dispute.X But while the acts of violence in the instant
case would thus gain no protection from the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Section 2o of
the Clayton Act, they would not constitute violations of the Sherman Act, for that act
is not a policing measure.13 The residuum of peaceful activities would still retain the
protection of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Section 20 of the Clayton Act and there-
fore would not be indictable under the Sherman Act. Only if the acts of violence have
been inseparable"4 from activities in restraint of interstate commerce can an indict-
ment under the Sherman Act be sustained. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, no matter how
closely combined with the Clayton Act, cannot be used to run specifically counter to
the expressed requirement of Section 20 of the Clayton Act that activities exempted be
peaceful.
"United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). Compare the language of the court
in United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 4 o F. Supp. 964, 965-66 (Ohio 1941). The district
court in the instant case looked solely to § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to determine
whether the activities complained of in the indictment were among the listed exemptions. The
court did not discuss the question whether there was a labor dispute, although its approach is
appropriate only in the event that a labor dispute has already been found to exist.
2 May's Furs & Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N.Y. 331, 342-43, 26 N.E. (2d) 279,
284-85 (i94o) (interpreting New York little Norris-LaGuardia Act).
'3 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 3o U.S. 469, 512 (1940).
'4 Examples of such a situation are provided by Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadow-
moor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (194), noted in 8 Univ.'Chi. L. Rev. 779 (x94i); Busch Jewelry
Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 281 N.Y. 150, 22 N.E. (2d) 320 (1939).
